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Abstract
Shannon’s fundamental bound for perfect secrecy says that the entropy of the secret message
cannot be larger than the entropy of the secret key initially shared by the sender and the legitimate
receiver. Massey gave an information theoretic proof of this result, however this proof does not require
independence of the key and ciphertext. By further assuming independence, we obtain a tighter lower
bound, namely that the key entropy is not less than the logarithm of the message sample size in any
cipher achieving perfect secrecy, even if the source distribution is fixed. The same bound also applies
to the entropy of the ciphertext. The bounds still hold if the secret message has been compressed before
encryption.
This paper also illustrates that the lower bound only gives the minimum size of the pre-shared
secret key. When a cipher system is used multiple times, this is no longer a reasonable measure for the
portion of key consumed in each round. Instead, this paper proposes and justifies a new measure for
key consumption rate. The existence of a fundamental tradeoff between the expected key consumption
and the number of channel uses for conveying a ciphertext is shown. Optimal and nearly optimal secure
codes are designed.
Index Terms
Shannon theory, information-theoretic security, perfect secrecy, joint source-encryption coding, one-
time pad.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Cipher systems with perfect secrecy were studied by Shannon in his seminal paper [1] (see
also [2]). With reference to Figure 1, a cipher system is defined by three components: a source
message U , a ciphertext X and a key R. The key is secret common randomness shared by the
sender and the legitimate receiver. The sender encrypts the message U , together with the key R,
into the ciphertext X . This ciphertext will be transmitted to the legitimate receiver via a public
channel. A cipher system is perfectly secure, or equivalently, satisfies a perfect secrecy constraint
if the message U and the ciphertext X are statistically independent, I(U ;X) = 0. In this case,
an adversary who eavesdrops on the public channel and learns X (but does not have R) will
not be able to infer any information about the message U . On the other hand, the legitimate
receiver decrypts the message U from the received ciphertext X together with the secret key R.
A cipher system is error-free (i.e., the probability of decoding error is zero) if H(U | XR) = 0.
Encoder DecoderU
X
R R
U
Fig. 1. A cipher system.
By considering a deterministic cipher, where X is a deterministic function of R and U ,
Shannon showed that the number of messages is equal to the number of possible ciphertexts,
and that the number of different keys is not less than the number of messages [1, p. 681],
|X | = |U| ≤ |R|,
where X , U and R are the respective supports of X , U and R. In order to design a perfectly
secure cipher system protecting a source with unknown source distribution PU , Shannon argued
that
H(R) ≥ log |U| ≥ H(U). (1)
He also made an important observation [1, p. 682] that
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2“the amount of of uncertainty we can introduce into the solution cannot be greater
than the key uncertainty”
In other words,
H(R) ≥ H(U). (2)
Massey [2] called (2) Shannon’s fundamental bound for perfect secrecy, and gave an information
theoretic proof for this result. It is important to note that Massey’s proof [2] does not require U
and R to be statistically independent.
Now, suppose U and R are indeed independent (which is common in practice). Our first main
result, Theorem 1 improves (2), showing that for any source distribution PU ,
PR(r) ≤ |U|
−1, ∀r. (3)
As a consequence, we prove that for any cipher achieving perfect secrecy, the logarithm of the
message sample size cannot be larger than the entropy of the secret key,
H(R) ≥ log |U|. (4)
Comparing with the first inequality in (1), we see that (4) is valid even if the source distribution
PU is fixed and known.
This paper is based on the model in Fig. 1. Despite its apparent simplicity, this is the most
general encoder possible, and covers many interesting special cases. For example, suppose the
distribution of U is non-uniform. One may expect that the optimal encoder will operate according
to Fig. 2, by first compressing U and then encrypting the compressed output.
Compress EncryptU X
R
Fig. 2. Compression before encryption.
Roughly speaking, compression converts the source into a sequence of independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) symbols. Theoretically, this can maximize the adversary’s decoding
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3error probability in some systems [3, Theorem 3]. Practically, the compressed output has a smaller
file size and hence seem to require less key for encryption. This approach of compression before
encryption was also proposed by Shannon [1, p. 682]. In fact, Shannon believed that, after
removing redundancy in the source,
“a bit of key completely conceals a bit of message information”.
However a separated compression before encryption model is a special case of our more general
model in Fig. 1. To certain extent, our model can be viewed as joint compression-encryption
coding. Naturally, our results also apply to models such as Fig. 2, for which we will later prove
H(X) ≥ log |U|.
This result, together with (4), in fact suggest that compression before encryption may not be
useful if both perfect secrecy and error-free decoding are required.
Another major contribution of this paper is the introduction of a new concept of expected
key consumption I(R;UX). Previously in the literature, the amount of key required in a cipher
system has been measured by the entropy of the common secret key. We will argue in this paper
that H(R) is only valid for measuring the initial key requirement, by which we mean the amount
of secret randomness that must be shared between the sender and the legitimate receiver, prior
to transmission of the ciphertext. Instead, key consumption should be measured by I(R;UX).
This new measure offers more insights, and in the second part of this paper, we will design
efficient cipher system that can be used multiple times, where I(R;UX) is one of the system
parameters to be optimised.
Besides expected key consumption, we also want to minimize the number of channel uses
required to transmit the ciphertext X from the source to the legitimate receiver. Naturally, we can
encode the ciphertext X using a Huffman code [4]. Let λ(X) be the codeword length. In this case,
the expected codeword length E[λ(X)] satisfies H(X) ≤ E[λ(X)] ≤ H(X) + 1. Note that for
two random variables X and X ′, it is possible that H(X) < H(X ′), but E[λ(X)] > E[λ(X)].
One example is when PX = (0.3, 0.23, 0.2, 0.17, 0.1) and PX′ = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.15, 0.1).
However, we still use H(X) instead of E[λ(X)] as a measure for the number of channel uses
required in a cipher system for two reasons: first, H(X) is a lower bound for E[λ(X)] and in
fact a very good estimate for E[λ(X)]; second, the problem itself is more tractable when using
H(X), instead of E[λ(X)].
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4We will show that there exists a fundamental tradeoff between the expected key consumption
and the number of channel uses. In fact, if the source distribution is not uniform, then the
minimum expected key consumption and the minimum number of channel uses cannot be
simultaneously achieved. We will also show that code design achieving minimum expected key
consumption depends on whether the source distribution PU has irrational probability masses or
not. Optimal code will be proposed for PU which has only rational probability masses.
Organization: In Section II, we consider one-shot systems, where there is a single message to
be securely transmitted. We formalize the system model, and new bounds on H(R) and H(X)
will be derived. In Section III, we will consider the case where cipher system is used multiple
times. New system parameters including I(R;UX) will be defined and justified. Section IV
will focus on two regimes corresponding to minimal expected key consumption and minimal
number of channel uses. The existence of a fundamental non-trivial tradeoff will be illustrated.
In Section V, the performance of compression-before-encryption will be evaluated.
Notation. Random variables are denoted by capital letters, e.g. X , and their particular
realizations are denoted by small letters, x. Supports of random variables are denoted by
calligraphic letters, X .
II. KEY REQUIREMENTS FOR ONE-SHOT CIPHERS
Definition 1 (Error free perfect secrecy system): A cipher system (R,U,X) is called an
Error-free Perfect-Secrecy (EPS) system if
I(U ;X) = 0, (5)
H(U | RX) = 0, (6)
I(U ;R) = 0. (7)
Here, (5) ensures perfect secrecy, via independence of the ciphertext X and source message U .
An eavesdropper learning X can infer no information about the message U . The constraint (6)
ensures that the receiver can reconstruct U from R and X without error. Finally (7) requires
that the shared secret key R is independent of the message U .
The constraints (5) and (6) were originally used in [2] to prove Shannon’s fundamental
bound (2) for perfect secrecy. The only additional constraint in Definition 1 is (7). In practice, R
is usually shared prior to the independent generation of the message U . This is a strong practical
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5motivation for (7). Furthermore, Definition 1 admits the general case of probabilistic encoding.
For the receiver, it is however sufficient to consider deterministic decoding since by (6), U is a
function of R and X . In other words, there exists a decoding function g such that
PURX(u, r, x) = PRX(r, x)1{u = g(r, x)}. (8)
Theorem 1 (Lower bounds on H(X) and H(R)): Let (R,U,X) be an error free prefect se-
crecy system, satisfying (5) – (7) according to Definition 1, and suppose PU is known. Then
max
x∈X
PX(x) ≤ |U|
−1, (9)
and
max
r∈R
PR(r) ≤ |U|
−1, (10)
where U is the support of the message U . Consequently,
log |U| ≤ H(X), (11)
with equality if and only if PX(x) = |U|−1 for all x ∈ X . Also,
log |U| ≤ H(R), (12)
with equality if and only if PR(r) = |U|−1 for all r ∈ R. If the source distribution is not uniform,
H(X) and H(R) are strictly greater than H(U).
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6Proof: For any x ∈ X ,
|U|PX (x) =
∑
u
PX (x) (13)
=
∑
u
PX|U (x | u) (14)
=
∑
u
∑
r:PURX(u,r,x)>0
PURX (u, r, x)
PU (u)
(15)
=
∑
u
∑
r:PURX(u,r,x)>0
PRX (r, x) 1 {u = g (r, x)}
PU (u)
(16)
=
∑
r:PRX(r,x)>0
PRX (r, x)
PU (g (r, x))
(17)
=
∑
r:PRX(r,x)>0
PRX (r, x)
PX|UR (x | g (r, x) , r) PR (r)
PURX (g (r, x) , r, x)
(18)
=
∑
r:PRX(r,x)>0
PX|UR (x | g (r, x) , r)PR (r) (19)
≤
∑
r:PRX(r,x)>0
PR (r) (20)
≤ 1, (21)
where (14), (16), (18) and (21) follow from (5), (8), (7) and (8), respectively. This establishes (9).
Let PB be a uniform distribution with support U . Since PX is always majorized1 by PB from
(9), [7, Theorem 10] shows that
H (PX) ≥ H (PB) +D (PB‖PX) (22)
≥ H (PB) (23)
= log |U|, (24)
and hence (11) is verified. Note that [7, Theorem 10] can still be applied even if X may be
defined on a countably infinite alphabet. If H(PX) = log |U|, equality in (23) holds so that
PX ≡ PB . Finally, (10) and (12) follow from the symmetric roles of X and R in (5) – (7).
1A good introduction to majorization theory can be found in [6]. In this proof, we just need the definition of “majorized by”
which can also be found in [7, Definition 1]
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7Corollary 2: No error free perfect secrecy system can be constructed if the source message
U has a countably infinite support or a support with unbounded size.
Proof: Assume in contradiction that an EPS system exists for a source message U ∼ PU
with countably infinite support, |U| = ∞. Note that (13) – (21) are still valid in this case.
However, the conclusion that |U|PX(x) ≤ 1 for any x ∈ X contradicts |U| =∞.
The following three remarks emphasize some of the (perhaps unexpected) consequences of
Theorem 1.
1) One could naturally expect that H(U) is the critical quantity setting a lower bound on
H(R) and H(X). However, Theorem 1 shows that H(R) and H(X) can be arbitrarily
large, as long as the size of the support of U is also arbitrarily large, even when H(U) is
small.
2) One may further expect that log |U| ≤ H(R) is tight only if the source distribution PU is
unknown. However, (11) and (12) show that fixing PU does not reduce the lower bounds
on either the initial key requirement, or the number of channel uses required to convey
the ciphertext.
3) If the source message U is defined on a countably infinite alphabet, it is not possible to
design an error free perfect secrecy system (Corollary 2). Therefore, if a cipher system is
required for such a source, at least one of the constraints (5) – (7) must be relaxed.
The following example compares Shannon’s fundamental bound (2) with Theorem 1. It also
illustrates that the quantity H(R) is insufficient for determination of the requirements on the
secret key R.
Example 1: Suppose PU = (0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0.1) so that H(U) = 1.895 bits and log |U| = 2 bits.
1) Consider R chosen independently of U according to PR = (0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2) so that
H(R) = 1.922 bits and H(U) < H(R) < log |U|. Although PR satisfies Shannon’s
fundamental bound (2), Theorem 1, in particular (12), shows this choice of key R is
insufficient to achieve error free perfect secrecy.
2) Consider PR = (0.4, 0.15, 0.15, 0.15, 0.15) so that H(R) = 2.171 bits and H(U) <
log |U| < H(R). However, this choice of key R is insufficient for error free perfect secrecy,
since from (10), maxr PR(r) = 0.4 > 0.25 = |U|−1.
Theorem 1 not only applies to systems of the form shown in Fig. 1 (which includes Fig. 2 as
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8a special case), but also to multi-letter variations. For example, we can accumulate n symbols
from the source (U1, U2, . . . , Un) and treat these n symbols together as one super-symbol U . It
is reasonable to consider finite n because practical systems have only finite resources to store
the super-symbol. Unless the source has some special structure, the distribution of U cannot
be uniform for any n if the Ui are not uniform. For example, if the source is stationary and
memoryless, accumulating symbols will only make H(X) and H(R) grow with n log |U|.
One may argue that the coding rate of H(X) could be reduced because the sender and receiver
share the same side information R and I(X ;R) > 0 is possible. In other words, a compressor
may be appended to the encoder in Fig. 1 in order to reduce the size of the ciphertext. This
configuration is shown in Fig. 3. However, we cannot simply apply the results from source coding
with side information here, because the ciphertext still needs to satisfy the security constraint. If
the new output Y satisfies the perfect secrecy and zero-error constraints, I(U ; Y ) = H(U |RY ) =
0, then (R,U, Y ) in Fig. 3 is simply another EPS system, governed by Theorem 1.
EPS Encryption CompressU
X
R
Y
Fig. 3. Compressing the output of an EPS cipher.
To complete this section, we show that the lower bounds (11) and (12) are simultaneously
achievable using a one-time pad [8].
Definition 2 (One-time pad): Without lost of generality, let U = {0, . . . ,M−1} be the support
of U . Let R be independent of U and uniformly distributed in U and let X be generated according
to the one-time pad as X = (U +R) mod M . Then U can be recovered via (X+R) mod M .
It is easy to verify that (5) – (7) are satisfied and H(X) = H(R) = logM . Therefore, we
have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Achieving the minimum H(X) and H(R)): Let U be the support of U . The one-
time pad of Definition 2 is an EPS system achieving H(X) = log |U| and H(R) = log |U|.
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9III. MULTIPLE MESSAGES AND KEY CONSUMPTION
In Section II, Theorem 3 proved that the one-time pad is “optimal” in the sense that it
simultaneously minimizes H(X) and H(R). This immediately suggests that the one-time pad
leaves no room for improvement. However, this conclusion in fact stems from a folk theorem
that the “required size of the secret key” is measured by the key entropy. The hidden assumption
behind this folklore is that the cipher system is used only once. In typical practice, a cipher
system will be used repeatedly for the transmission of multiple messages.
Consider the following scenario. Suppose an initial secret key R is delivered to the sender
and the receiver prior to commencement of message transmission. Now, suppose the sender uses
this key to encrypt a message U , which is then delivered to the receiver over the public channel.
Clearly, some portion of the secret randomness R has now been used. The central question is as
follows: Can the sender and receiver continue to securely communicate without first receiving a
new key? For example, if U is a single bit and R is a 100-bit random key, it is indeed likely that
another message can be securely transmitted. The natural questions are: What is the maximum
size of the second message? Alternatively, how much of the key R was consumed in the first
round of transmission? Below, we will show that when an error free perfect secrecy system is
used multiple times, the key consumption should not be measured by H(R) but by I(R;UX).
In fact, with respect to our definitions, we will exhibit systems with key consumption that can
be made arbitrarily close to H(U).
The following example illustrates some of the basic ideas which will be elaborated in this
section.
Example 2: Suppose the sender and the receiver share a secret key R = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn},
where all of the Bi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n are independent and uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. Let
PU(0) = 0.5 and PU(1) = PU(2) = 0.25. Construct a new random variable U ′ such that
U ′ =


(0, Bn+1) , U = 0
(1, 0), U = 1
(1, 1), U = 2
(25)
where Bn+1 is generated by the sender independently of U and R such that PBn+1(0) =
PBn+1(1) = 0.5.
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Let K = (B1, B2) and X = U ′ ⊕K. Upon receiving X , the receiver can decode U from X
and K, where K is solely a function of R. In fact, if U = 0, the receiver can further decode
Bn+1. Let
R′ =


(B3, B4, . . . , Bn), U ∈ {1, 2}
(B3, B4, . . . , Bn, Bn+1), U = 0.
We refer to R′ as the residual secret randomness shared by the sender and the receiver. Note
that R′ may not be a deterministic function of R, as the new shared common randomness can be
generated by a probabilistic encoder. According to (25), a new random bit is secretly transmitted
from the sender to the receiver when U = 0. After the system is used once, the expected key
consumption is therefore given by
PU(0) · 1 + PU(1) · 2 + PU(2) · 2 = 1.5 = H(U), (26)
which happens to also equal I(R;UX). It turns out that this is not mere coincidence.
We now define three parameters whose operational meanings are justified in the rest of this
section.
Definition 3: The residual secret randomness of an error free perfect secrecy system is
H (R | UX) .
Definition 4: The expected key consumption of an error free perfect secrecy system is
I(R;UX).
Definition 5: The excess key consumption of an error free perfect secrecy system is
I(R;X).
Roughly speaking, we will show that after an EPS system is used once, H(R | UX) is the
amount of remaining key that can be used for encryption of the next message. Since the sender
and the receiver initially share a quantity H(R) of secret randomness, the key consumption is
equal to H(R)−H(R|UX) = I(R;UX). We will provide achievable schemes to show that the
minimal key consumption is H(U) and hence, the excess key consumption is I(R;UX)−H(U)
which is equal to I(R;X) in an EPS system.
We first justify Definition 3. Consider the scenario of Fig. 4 in which the sender and receiver
share a secret key R, and two EPS systems are used sequentially by the sender to securely
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transmit two (possibly correlated) messages U and V . In the first round, the sender encodes
the message U into X , which is transmitted to the receiver as described in Section II. In the
second round, the sender further encodes V (or more generally both U and V ) into Y , which
is then transmitted to the receiver. As before, we require H(U | RX) = H(V | RXY ) = 0 and
I(UV ;XY ) = 0 to ensure zero-error decoding and perfect secrecy.
U
X
R
Y
PX|RU
PY |RV
V
Fig. 4. Using an error free prefect secrecy system twice.
Theorem 4 (Justification 1): Consider the two-round error free perfect secrecy system of
Fig. 4. If
I(UV ;XY ) = H(U | RX) = H(V | RXY ) = 0, (27)
then the entropy of the second message V conditioning on the first message U is upper bounded
by the residual secret randomness,
H(V | U) ≤ H(R | UX). (28)
Proof: Note that
H(R | UX)−H(V | U) + I(UV ;XY ) +H(U | RX) +H(V | RXY )
= I(V Y ;U | RX) + I(RU ; Y | X) + I(U ;X) +H(U | RXY ) +H(R | UV XY ) ≥ 0.
Together with (27), (28) is verified.
Theorem 4 implies that the maximum amount of information which can be secretly transmitted
in the second round is upper bounded by the residual secret randomness H(R | UX), suggesting
that H(R | UX) is indeed measures the amount of key unused in the first round. Equivalently,
the amount of key that has been consumed in the first round is equal to
I(R;UX) = H(R)−H(R | UX).
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Whereas Theorem 4 justifies the residual key H(R | UX) as bounding the entropy of the
second round message, we now offer an alternative justification, showing that the size of the
key that can be extracted after n uses of an EPS system is about nH(R | UX).
Consider generation of a new secret key as shown in Fig. 5. Suppose a sequence of EPS
systems {(Ui, Ri, Xi)}ni=1 has been used by a sender and a receiver where (Ui, Ri, Xi) are i.i.d.
with generic distribution PURX . We use (U,R,X) to denote the generic random variables. In
order to securely send additional messages, the sender and the receiver aim to establish a new
secret key Sm = (S1, . . . , Sm), where the Si are i.i.d. with generic distribution PS . To generate
the new key Sm, we assume that the sender can send a secret message A to the receiver. The
new secret key Sm will be used to encrypt a second sequence of messages V m, generating a
ciphertext sequence Y m such that {(Vi, Si, Yi)}mi=1 is another sequence of EPS systems.
Encoder Decoder
Encoder Decoder
U
n
U
n
Rn Rn
X
n
A A
Sm Sm
Y
m
V
m
V
m
Fig. 5. Generating a new secret key Sm.
Assume
I (V m;SmUnXn) = 0 (29)
I (UnXn; Y m | V mSm) = 0 (30)
H (Sm | RnUnXnA) = 0 (31)
I (Sm;UnXn) = 0. (32)
These assumptions adopted with the following reasoning. We assume in (29) that the new
message V m is generated independently of the previous uses of the EPS systems. Also, (30)
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holds due to (Un, Xn) − (V m, Sm) − Y m forms a Markov chain. The sender and the receiver
can agree on Sm without error due to (31). The justification of (32) is given as follows.
Although {(Ui, Ri, Xi)}ni=1 and {(Vi, Si, Yi)}mi=1 are individually sequences of EPS systems, it
is possible that their combination is not secure, I(Xn, Y m;Un, V m) > 0. For example, suppose
Un and V m are i.i.d. with uniform distribution and m = n. If Sm = Un, then using a one-time
pad, I(V m; Y m) = 0 but I(Xn, Y m;Un, V m) ≥ H(Un). The following theorem shows that joint
EPS systems satisfying (29) – (32) are still perfectly secure.
Theorem 5: Consider two sequences of i.i.d. EPS systems {(Ui, Ri, Xi)}ni=1 and
{(Vi, Si, Yi)}
m
i=1 satisfying (29) – (32). Then the joint EPS system is still perfectly secure,
I (XnY m;UnV m) = 0. (33)
Proof: By assumption
I(Un;Xn) = I(V m; Y m) = I(V m;Sm, Un, Xn) =
I(Un, Xn; Y m|V m, Sm) = I(Sm;Un, Xn) = 0. (34)
Note that
I (Sm;Un, Xn) + I (V m;Sm, Un, Xn) + I (V m; Y m) +
I (Un;Xn) + I (Un, Xn; Y m | V mSm)− I (Xn, Y m;Un, V m)
= I (Un, Xn;Sm | V m, Y m) + I (V m;Sm) + I (Xn; Y m) + I (Un;V m) ≥ 0.
Together with (34), I(Xn, Y m;Un, V m) ≤ 0. Since I(Xn, Y m;Un, V m) ≥ 0, (33) is verified.
In order to generate a new key Sm, a secret auxiliary random variable A is sent from the
sender to the receiver. Here, A is generated by a probabilistic encoder with {(Ri, Ui, Xi)}ni=1 as
input. In Example 2 above, suppose we wanted to restore n secret bits after the system is used
once. Then A is a fair bit if U = 0 and A consists of two fair bits if U = 1 or 2. We measure
the expected size of A by H (A | RnUnXn). Since we can directly treat A as the new secret
key Sm, it is reasonable to expect that H(Sm) ≥ H (A | RnUnXn). Therefore, it is of interest
to know by how much H(Sm) can exceed H(A | Rn, Un, Xn) for a given sequence of EPS
systems. The following theorem shows that the secret randomness, which can be extracted from
{(Ri, Ui, Xi)}
n
i=1 with help from A, is measured by the residual secret randomness H(R | U,X).
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Theorem 6 (Justification 2): Consider two sequences of i.i.d. EPS systems {(Ui, Ri, Xi)}ni=1
and {(Vi, Si, Yi)}mi=1 and any A. If (29) – (32) are satisfied, then
H (Sm)−H (A | RnUnXn) ≤ nH (R | UX) . (35)
On the other hand, it is possible to generate Sm such that (29) – (32) are satisfied and
H (Sm)−H (A | RnUnXn) ≥ nH (R | UX)− log 2 (36)
for a sufficiently large m such that
max
sm
PSm(s
m) < min
rn,un,xn
PRn|UnXn (r
n | un, xn) .
Proof: We first prove (35) by showing that
H (Sm) = I (Sm;UnXn) +H (Sm | ARnUnXn) + I (Sm;ARn | UnXn) (37)
= I (Sm;ARn | UnXn) (38)
≤ H (ARn | UnXn) (39)
= H (A | RnUnXn) +H (Rn | UnXn) (40)
= H (A | RnUnXn) + nH (R | UX) , (41)
where (38) follows from (31) – (32) and (41) follows from the fact that {(Ui, Ri, Xi)}ni=1 is a
sequence of i.i.d. EPS systems.
The proof of the achievability part in (36) is via construction. With reference to Fig. 6, consider
two partitions of the unit interval into disjoint “cells”. The width of cell i in the first partition is
PSm(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ |S|m, where S is the support of Si. Consider Un = un and Xn = xn. The
width of cell i in the second partition is PRn|Un,Xn (i | un, xn) for 1 ≤ i ≤ |R|n. The distribution
of A is constructed to divide the second partition as shown in Fig. 6. To simplify notations, we
consider the support of Rn to be a set of consecutive integers {1, ..., |R′|} when Un = un and
Xn = xn. Suppose Rn = r and let
b = max
{
j :
j∑
i=1
PS(i) >
r−1∑
i=1
PRn|Un,Xn (i | u
n, xn)
}
. (42)
For j ≥ 1, A is defined by PA(j) = a(j)PRn|Un,Xn(r|un,xn) , where
j∑
i=1
a(i) = min
{
b+j−1∑
i=1
PS(i),
r∑
i=1
PRn|Un,Xn (i | u
n, xn)
}
−
r−1∑
i=1
PRn|Un,Xn (i | u
n, xn) . (43)
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1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4
1 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 2
|S|
m
|R′|
Fig. 6. An assignment of A.
For the example in Fig. 6, when Rn = 1,
PA(1) =
PSm(1)
PRn|Un,Xn (1 | un, xn)
= 1− PA(2). (44)
When Rn = 2,
PA(1) =
PSm(1) + PSm(2)− PRn|Un,Xn (1 | u
n, xn)
PRn|Un,Xn (2 | un, xn)
= 1− PA(2). (45)
By definition Sm is determined from Rn and A for any fixed Un = un and Xn = xn. On the
other hand, A is also determined from Sm and Rn. Therefore,
H (Sm | A,Rn, Un, Xn) = H (A | Sm, Rn, Un, Xn) = 0. (46)
By choosing m sufficiently large, such that
max
sm
PSm(s
m) < min
rn,un,xn
PRn|Un,Xn (r
n | un, xn) , (47)
Rn can take at most two possible values for any given (Sm, Un, Xn) and hence
H (Rn | Sm, Un, Xn) ≤ log 2. (48)
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Therefore,
H (A | RnUnXn) (49)
= I (A;Sm | RnUnXn) +H (A | SmRnUnXn) (50)
= I (A;Sm | RnUnXn) +H (Sm | ARnUnXn) (51)
= H (Sm | RnUnXn) (52)
= H (Sm)−H (Rn | UnXn) +H (Rn | SmUnXn)− I(Sm;Un, Xn) (53)
≤ H (Sm)−H (Rn | UnXn) +H (Rn | SmUnXn) (54)
≤ H (Sm)−H (Rn | UnXn) + log 2, (55)
where (51) and (55) follow from (46) and (48), respectively. Since {(Ui, Ri, Xi)}ni=1 is a sequence
if i.i.d. EPS systems, (36) is verified.
For any (Un, Xn), the same PSm|Un,Xn ≡ PSm is generated. Therefore, (32) is verified. Since
Sm is determined by (Rn, Un, Xn, A), (31) is verified, and (29) can also be verified as V m is
independent of (Rn, Un, Xn, A). Finally, (30) is due to the fact that {(Vi, Si, Yi)}mi=1 is a sequence
of EPS systems.
Roughly speaking, Theorem 6 shows that for large n and m, the optimal algorithm with the
help of A can extract approximately
nH (R | UX)
bits of residual secret randomness from {(Ri, Ui, Xi)}ni=1. In [9], we considered another algorithm
generating a new secret key with asymptotic rate H (R | UX) without using an auxiliary secret
random variable. As the sender and receiver initially share nH(R) bits of secret randomness,
the expected key consumption for each use of the EPS system is
H(R)−H(R | UX) = I(R;UX),
the quantity proposed in Definition 4. Next, we exhibit an important property of I(R;UX).
Theorem 7: In an error free perfect secrecy system, the expected key consumption is lower
bounded by the source entropy,
I(R;UX) ≥ H(U), (56)
where equality holds if and only if I(R;X) = 0.
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Proof: The information diagram for the random variables U,X,R involved in an error free
perfect secrecy system satisfying (5) – (7) is shown in Fig. 7(a). It is easy to verify that
I(X ;R) = I(R;UX)−H(U). (57)
Since I(X ;R) ≥ 0, Theorem 7 is proved.
U X
R
0
a
−a
b
c
a
d
(a) General EPS system
a
U X
R
0
a
−a
c
a
d
(b) Minimum expected key consumption,
achieving equality in (56)
Fig. 7. Information diagrams.
In Section IV-A, we will describe several EPS coding schemes achieving I(R;UX) = H(U).
Therefore, I(X ;R) measures the difference between the expected key consumption of an
EPS system and the minimum possible key consumption, again justifying Definition 5. The
information diagram for the optimal case I(X ;R) = 0 is shown in Fig. 7(b).
We summarize this section in the following three remarks.
1) Theorems 4 and 6 provide strong justification of I(R;UX) as the expected key consump-
tion required to achieve error free perfect secrecy. Theorem 7 shows that the expected
key consumption cannot be less than the source entropy. Recall that Theorem 1 gives the
lower bound on the initial key requirement. Therefore, we have distinguished between
two different concepts (a) expected key consumption in a multi-round system and (b) the
initial key requirement for a one-shot system. In contrast to the bound H(R) ≥ H(U) [1],
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[2], Theorem 7 more precisely describes the role of H(U) in an error free perfect secrecy
system.
2) From (5)–(7) we can show that
H(R) = H(U) + I(X ;R) +H(R | UX). (58)
Thus the key entropy H(R) consists of three parts: the randomness used to protect the
source, the excess key consumption and the residual secret randomness.
3) If the source distribution is uniform, Example 3 below shows that the one-time pad achieves
minimal key consumption.
Example 3 (Uniform source distribution): Suppose U and R are independent and are uni-
formly distributed on the sets {0, 1, . . . , 2i−1} and {0, 1, . . . , 2j−1}, respectively, where i ≤ j.
In order to derive a coding system satisfying (5) – (7), we can first extract i random bits R′
from R and construct X as the modulo-two addition of the binary representation of U and R′.
Then
I(R;UX) = H(R)−H(R | UX) (59)
= H(R)−H(R | R′) (60)
= j − (j − i) (61)
= H(U). (62)
IV. TRADEOFF BETWEEN KEY CONSUMPTION AND NUMBER OF CHANNEL USES
Example 3 shows that the one-time pad simultaneously achieves the minimal expected key
consumption and the minimum number of channel uses for a uniform source. However for
general non-uniform sources, we will show that there is a non-trivial tradeoff between these two
quantities.
We will consider two important regimes. First, in Section IV-A, we will consider the regime
in which ciphers minimize the key consumption I(R;UX). Conversely, in Section IV-B we
consider systems which minimize the number of channel uses H(X).
We shall demonstrate the existence of a fundamental, non-trivial tradeoff between the expected
key consumption and the number of channel uses. Our main results, Theorem 1 proved earlier,
and Theorems 7 – 14 to be proved below, are summarized in Fig. 8.
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Point 1 is due to Theorem 14 in Section IV-B below, and has the smallest I(R;UX) among
all EPS systems with H(X) = log |U|. We shall show that this point can always be achieved by
one-time pad.
Point 2 has the smallest H(X) among all the EPS systems with I(R;UX) = H(U). For this
point, Theorem 11 in Section IV-A gives the lower bound on H(X) which is strictly greater
than log |U| if PU is not uniform.
If PU has only rational probability masses, Theorem 8 in Section IV-A below shows that Point
3 can be achieved by a generalization of the one-time pad, the partition code (to be introduced
in Definition 6).
If all the probabilities masses in PU are the integer multiples of the smallest probability mass
in PU , then Point 2 coincides with Point 3 by the partition code shown in Theorem 13. Otherwise,
Point 3 can differ from Point 2 which will be demonstrated in Example 4.
The existence, continuity and non-increasing in H(X) properties of the curved portion of the
tradeoff curve are established in Section IV-C.
H(X)
I(R;UX)
log |U|
H(U)
log θlog |U|
1
2 3
Fig. 8. Tradeoff between I(R;UX) and H(X).
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A. Minimal expected key consumption
We first consider EPS systems which achieve minimal expected key consumption. From
Theorem 7, an error free perfect secrecy system with minimal key consumption satisfies (5)–(7)
and
I(X ;R) = 0. (63)
We now generalize the one-time pad to achieve minimal key consumption for source distributions
containing only rational probability masses.
Definition 6 (Partition Code C(Ψ)): Assume that U is a random variable defined on
{1, . . . , ℓ}. Let Ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψℓ) and let θ =
∑ℓ
i=1 ψi where ψi and θ are positive integers.
Let A′ be a random variable such that
Pr(A′ = j | U = i) =


1
ψi
if 1 ≤ j ≤ ψi,
0 otherwise.
Let A =
∑U−1
i=1 ψi+A
′−1, R be uniformly distributed on the set {0, 1, . . . , θ−1} and X = A+R
mod θ. The so defined cipher system (R,U,X) is called the partition code C(Ψ).
Note that one-time pad is a special case of partition code when Ψ = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
It can be proved directly that a partition code satisfies (5) – (7) and hence is an EPS system.
Furthermore, we can verify that
H(X) = H(R) = log θ, (64)
and
I(R;UX) =
ℓ∑
i=1
PU(i) log
θ
ψi
, (65)
where (65) is from H(X | U,R) = H(A | U,R) =∑ℓi=1 PU(i) logψi together with (64).
Let QU be the probability distribution such that QU(i) = ψi/θ. Then (65) can be rewritten as
I(R;UX) = H(U) +D(PU‖QU), (66)
where D(·‖·) is the relative entropy [4]. Consequently, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8: Suppose the probability mass PU(i) is rational for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ. Let θ be
an integer such that θ · PU(i) is also an integer for all i, and let Ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψℓ) with
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ψi = θ ·PU(i). Then the EPS system (R,U,X) induced by the partition code C(Ψ) achieves the
lower bound in (56), namely I(R;UX) = H(U).
In the following theorem, we prove that if the source distribution PU is not rational, then
partition code will not achieve zero key-excess with finite X or R. Its proof is deferred to
Section VI.
Theorem 9: Suppose U , X , and R satisfy (5) – (7) and (63). If there exists u ∈ U such that
PU(u) is irrational, then the support of X and R cannot be finite.
Although it is difficult to construct codes satisfying (5) – (7) and (63) for PU having irrational
probability masses, Theorem 7 still gives a tight bound on I(R;UX) as shown in the following
theorem.
Theorem 10: Suppose the support of PU is a finite set of integers {1, . . . , ℓ}. Let Ψ =
(ψ1, . . . , ψℓ+1) with
ψi =


⌊PU(i)θ⌋, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ,
θ −
∑ℓ
i=1⌊PU(i)θ⌋, i = ℓ+ 1.
Assume that θ is large enough such that ⌊PU(i)θ⌋ ≥ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. For the partition code
C(Ψ), I(R;UX)→ H(U) as θ →∞.
Proof: Consider a probability distribution QU with QU(i) = ψi/θ for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ + 1. As
θ → ∞, QU converges pointwise to PU and hence D(PU‖QU) → 0 for finite ℓ. The theorem
thus follows from (66).
In addition to minimizing the key consumption I(R;UX), we may also want to simultaneously
minimize H(X), which is the number of channel uses required to convey the ciphertext X . The
following theorem and corollary illustrate that the zero key-excess condition can be very harsh,
requiring the EPS system to have a very large H(R) and H(X), even for very simple sources.
Theorem 11 (EPS systems with minimal I(R;UX)): Let X , R and U be the respective
supports of random variables X , R, and U satisfying (5)–(7) and (63). Then
max
x∈X
PX(x) ≤ min
u∈U
PU(u) (67)
and
max
r∈R
PR(r) ≤ min
u∈U
PU(u). (68)
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Proof: Consider any u ∈ U and x ∈ X . By definition, PU(u) > 0 and PX(x) > 0.
From (5), we have PUX(u, x) = PU(u)PX(x) > 0. Consequently, there exists r ∈ R such that
PUXR(u, x, r) > 0. Notice that
PUXR(u, x, r) = PXR(x, r) (69)
= PX(x)PR(r), (70)
where (69) is due to (6) and (70) is due to (63). On the other hand,
PUXR(u, x, r) ≤ PUR(u, r) (71)
= PU(u)PR(r), (72)
where (72) is due to (7). Finally, as PR(r) > 0, we have PX(x) ≤ PU(u) and (67) follows. Due
to the symmetric roles of X and R, the theorem is proved.
The results in Theorem 11 are used to obtain bounds on H(X) and H(R) in the following
corollary. Define the binary entropy function, h(γ) = −γ log γ−(1−γ) log(1−γ) for 0 < γ < 1
and h(0) = h(1) = 0.
Corollary 12: Let X , R and U be the respective supports of random variables X , R, and U
satisfying (5) – (7) and (63). Then
min{H(X), H(R)} ≥h(π⌊π−1⌋) + π⌊π−1⌋ log⌊π−1⌋ (73)
≥ log
1
π
, (74)
where π = minu∈U PU(u) and the right sides of (73) and (74) are equal if and only if π−1 is an
integer.
Proof: From (67), maxx∈X PX(x) ≤ minu∈U PU(u). Together with [7, Theorem 10], this
establishes (73). To prove (74), we first consider the case when π−1 is an integer. Then
h(π⌊π−1⌋) + π⌊π−1⌋ log⌊π−1⌋ =h(1) + ππ−1 log
1
π
= log
1
π
.
If π−1 is not an integer, then
1− π⌊π−1⌋ < π.
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Hence,
h(π⌊π−1⌋) + π⌊π−1⌋ log⌊π−1⌋
= π⌊π−1⌋ log
1
π⌊π−1⌋
+ (1− π⌊π−1⌋) log
1
1− π⌊π−1⌋
+ π⌊π−1⌋ log⌊π−1⌋
> π⌊π−1⌋ log
1
π
+ (1− π⌊π−1⌋) log
1
π
= log
1
π
.
Furthermore, the right hand sides of (73) and (74) are equal only if π−1 is an integer. This proves
the lower bounds on H(X). Due to the symmetric roles of X and R, the theorem is proved.
Suppose PU is not uniform so that minu∈U PU(u) < |U|−1. In this case, (74) shows that
min{H(X), H(R)} > log |U|. (75)
Comparing with (11) and (12) in Theorem 1, a larger initial key requirement and a larger number
of channel uses are required for systems which achieve the minimal expected key consumption.
The following theorem shows that the lower bounds in (74) can be achieved for certain PU
including the uniform distribution and D-adic distributions, PU(u) = D−i for certain integers D
and i.
Theorem 13: Let U = {1, . . . , ℓ} and let PU(ℓ) ≤ PU(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. If there exists a set
of positive integers Ψ = {ψi} such that PU(i) = ψiPU(ℓ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, then the partition code
C(Ψ) simultaneously achieves the minimum H(X) and H(R) among all EPS systems achieving
minimal key consumption.
Proof: Suppose (R,U,X) satisfies (5) – (7) and (63) so that H(X) ≥ log 1
PU (ℓ)
from (74).
Note that PU(ℓ) = (
∑ℓ
i=1 ψi)
−1 from the definition of Ψ. Therefore
H(X) ≥ log
(
ℓ∑
i=1
ψi
)
. (76)
The partition code C(Ψ) has θ =
∑ℓ
i=1 ψi so that it can achieve equality in (76) from (64).
Similarly, we can argue that the partition code C(Ψ) achieves the minimum H(R).
For some other source distributions PU , the partition code may not achieve the minimal number
of channel uses H(X), as illustrated in the following example.
Example 4: Consider an EPS system (R,U,X) such that
1) U is a binary random variables where PU(0) = 3/5.
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2) X and R take values from the set {0, 1, 2, 3}.
3) PX(0) = PR(0) = 2/5, PX(i) = PR(i) = 1/5 for i = 1, 2, 3.
4) I(X ;R) = 0 so that PXR(xr) = PX(x)PR(r) for all x and r.
5) U is a function of (X,R) such that U = 0 if and only if (i) X = 0 and R 6= 0, or (ii)
R = 0 and X 6= 0, or (iii) X = R 6= 0. Consequently, PU |XR(u | x, r) is well-defined.
It is straightforward to check that {U,X,R} satisfies (5) – (7) and (63) and H(X) = H(R) <
log 5. However θ = 5 is the smallest integer such that θ · PU(u) is an integer. In this example,
H(X) is smaller than the value given in (64). While Theorem 13 shows that partition code can
simultaneously minimize H(X) and H(R) under the conditions (5) – (7) and (63), this example
shows that partition code is not necessarily optimal in terms of minimizing H(X) for a general
source.
B. Minimal number of channel uses
In the previous subsection, we proposed partition codes C(Ψ) which minimize the expected
key consumption for error free perfect secrecy systems. However, we also demonstrated that these
codes do not guarantee the minimal number of channel uses H(X), among all other EPS systems
which also minimize the expected key consumption. Finding an EPS system which minimizes
the number of channel uses for a given expected key consumption is a very challenging open
problem. In this subsection, we aim to minimize I(R;UX) in the regime where H(X) meets
the lower bound in Theorem 1, H(X) = log |U|. Unlike in Section IV-A, we can completely
characterize this regime.
Using Theorem 3, we can show that by using one-time pad,
H(U) ≤ log |U| = H(X) = H(R) = I(R;UX).
Therefore, in this instance, the expected key consumption I(R;UX) is not minimal when the
source U is not uniform. However, the following theorem shows that among all EPS systems
which minimize the number of channel uses, the one-time pad minimizes the expected key
consumption.
Theorem 14: Consider any EPS system (R,U,X) (e.g., one-time pad) with H(X) = log |U|.
Then I(R;UX) = log |U| and H(X|RU) = 0.
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Proof: If H(X) = log |U|, PX(x) = 1/|U| for x ∈ X and
|X | = |U| (77)
from Theorem 1. Let
Xru = {x ∈ X : PRUX(r, u, x) > 0}
be the set of possible values of X when R = r and U = u. Due to (8), Xri ∩ Xrj = ∅ if i 6= j.
Together with (77),
|U| = |X | ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
u
Xru
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∑
u
|Xru| ≥ |U|min
u
|Xru|. (78)
On the other hand, for any r ∈ R and u ∈ U∑
x∈Xru
PRUX(r, u, x) = PUR(u, r) = PU(u)PR(r) > 0
from (7), and hence, |Xru| ≥ 1. Substituting this result into (78) shows that |Xru| = 1. Therefore,
X is a function of R and U , which verifies
H(X | UR) = 0. (79)
Together with (5) – (7), it is easy to verify that I(R;UX) = H(X) = log |U|.
C. The fundamental tradeoff
An important open problem is to find coding schemes which can achieve points on the tradeoff
curve between Points 1 and 2 in Figure 8. For a given source distribution PU and number of
channel uses H(X) = log |U| + γ, with γ ≥ 0 we need to solve the following optimization
problem,
f(γ) = inf
PRX|U∈Pγ
I(R;UX), (80)
where
Pγ =
{
PRX|U : I(R;U) = I(X ;U) = H(U |X,R) = 0, H(X) = log |U|+ γ
} (81)
is the set of feasible conditional distributions yielding an EPS system with the specified number
of channel uses.
Solving (80) remains open in general, however two important structural properties of f(γ)
are given in the following theorem.
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Proposition 15: Let PU and γ ≥ 0 be given. Then Pγ defined in (81) is non-empty for γ ≥ 0,
and f(γ) defined in (80) is non-increasing in γ.
Proof: A non-vacuous feasible set is demonstrated as follows. Let (R,U,X) be a given
EPS system. Define a second EPS system (R′, U ′, X ′) as follows. Let (R′, U ′) = (R,U) and
X ′ = (X,A), where A is a random variable independent of (R,U,X) such that H(A) = δ for
any given δ ≥ 0. In other words, (R′, U ′, X ′) is constructed by adding some spurious randomness
into the ciphertext of the EPS system (R,U,X). Setting δ = γ and supposing that (R,U,X) is
a cipher system using a one-time pad yields PR′X′|U ′ ∈ Pγ .
By the same trick, we can show that f(γ) is non-increasing. For any γ > 0 and ǫ > 0, let
(R,U,X) be an EPS system such that PRX|U ∈ Pγ and
I(R;UX) < f(γ) + ǫ. (82)
It is easy to check that PR′X′|U ′ ∈ Pγ+δ and H(X | UR) = H(X ′ | U ′R′)− δ. Then
f(γ + δ) = inf
P
R˜X˜|U˜∈Pγ+δ
I(X˜ ; U˜R˜) (83)
= inf
P
R˜X˜|U˜∈Pγ+δ
(
H(X˜)−H(X˜ | U˜R˜)
)
(84)
= log |U|+ γ + δ − sup
P
R˜X˜|U˜∈Pγ+δ
H(X˜ | U˜ R˜) (85)
≤ log |U |+ γ + δ −H(X ′ | U ′R′) (86)
= H(X)−H(X | UR) (87)
< f(γ) + ǫ, (88)
where (88) follows from (82). Since ǫ > 0 is arbitrary, the second claim of the proposition is
proved.
V. COMPRESSION BEFORE ENCRYPTION
In Section I we discussed the standard approach of compression-before-encryption (cf. Fig. 2)
suggested by Shannon. In the following, we will show that this approach is not necessarily the
right way to minimize either I(R;UX) or H(X) in error free perfect secrecy systems. For
simplicity, all units in this section are in bits and logarithms are with base 2.
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A central idea in lossless data compression is to encode frequently occurring symbols (or
strings) using shorter codewords. However, this can cause problems in the context of EPS
systems. For instance, suppose our cipher consists of a Huffman code followed by a one-
time pad using a key with the same length as the Huffman codeword. At first glance, this
approach can reduce both the ciphertext size and the key size to the minimum expected codeword
length. Unfortunately, this method is not secure because the length of the output discloses some
information about the message. Consider an extreme case that the message is generated according
to PU(i) = 2−i for 1 ≤ i < ℓ and PU(ℓ) = 2−(ℓ−1). If a binary Huffman code is used, the message
is uniquely identified by the length when U < ℓ− 1.
This problem can be solved by different methods. One solution has been discussed in
Example 2. In this section, we only consider the compress-encrypt-pad scheme of Fig. 9, since
this is sufficient to illustrate the deficiencies of compression before encryption.
In Fig. 9, a prefix code is used to encode the message U and a codeword with length σ(U)
is obtained. The codeword is further encrypted by one-time pad using a key with the same
length σ(U). After application of the one-time pad, fair bits are appended such that the output
has a constant length γ equal to the longest codeword, maxu∈U σ(u). The receiver decrypts the
message by applying the key bit-by-bit to the ciphertext until a codeword in the prefix code is
obtained.
Prefix Code Padding
U
(
c1, . . . , cσ(U)
) (
e1, . . . , eσ(U)
)
(
k1, . . . , kσ(U)
)
X = (e1, . . . , eγ)
Fig. 9. A compression-encryption-padding scheme.
In this scheme, the ciphertext X has a uniform distribution so that H(X) = γ. Since γ is the
length of the longest codeword and a prefix code is uniquely decodable, γ ≥ log ℓ, where ℓ = |U|.
Therefore, H(X) ≥ log ℓ, in agreement with Theorem 1. This scheme requires an initial key of
length H(R) ≥ log ℓ bits providing a sufficiently long secret key in case the longest codeword
is the one that happens to be generated.
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Let us now compare the performance of this scheme with the bounds obtained in Section IV-A,
where the minimal expected key consumption is assumed. Suppose the Shannon code [4] is used
in the scheme described in Fig. 9 to construct an EPS system. The performance is given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 16: If the Shannon code is used in the compress-encrpyt-pad scheme described in
Fig. 9 to construct an EPS system, then
H(R) = H(X) =
⌈
log
1
π
⌉
, (89)
which exceeds the lower bound in (74) by no more than 1 bit. Furthermore, the expected key
consumption exceeds the lower bound (56) by no more than 1 bit,
I(R;UX) ≤ H(U) + 1.
Proof: Recall that σ(u) is the length of the codeword assigned to U = u. Then the longest
codeword has length equal to ⌈
log
1
π
⌉
, (90)
where π = minu∈U PU(u). Recall in Fig. 9 that fair bits are appended to each codeword to
construct a constant length ciphertext X . Therefore, H(R) = H(X) =
⌈
log 1
π
⌉
which is within
one bit of the lower bound in (74). Furthermore, the expected key consumption
I(R;UX) = H(R)−H(R | UX) (91)
=
⌈
log
1
π
⌉
−
(⌈
log
1
π
⌉
−
∑
u∈U
PU(u)σ(u)
)
(92)
=
∑
u∈U
PU(u)σ(u) (93)
≤ H(U) + 1, (94)
where (92) follows from the fact that H(R | UX) is equal to the number of appended fair bits,
and (94) follows from [4, (5.29)–(5.32)]. Therefore, I(R;UX) is also within a bit of the lower
bound in (56).
Therefore, we conclude that if the Shannon code is used for compression in Fig. 9, then the
performance is close to the optimal code in the minimal key consumption regime when both
H(U)≫ 1 and log 1
π
≫ 1.
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Now, we compare the performance obtained when the Huffman code is used in place of the
Shannon code. In this case, the expected key consumption I(R;UX) can again be analyzed
similar to (91) – (94). Since the expected codeword length in (93) is shorter for the Huffman
code, a smaller I(R;UX) can be obtained. However, the longest codeword in the Huffman code
can be longer than the longest codeword in the Shannon code. As a consequence, larger H(X)
and H(R) are required for certain PU . This can be seen in the example in Table I. In the worst
case, the longest codeword in the Huffman code can be as much as 44% longer than the longest
codeword in the Shannon code [10]. Furthermore, the partition code C(Ψ) in Table I outperforms
the compression before encryption schemes based on either the Huffman code or the Shannon
code because C(Ψ) is optimal according to Theorem 13. On the other hand, the Shannon code
uses unnecessarily long codewords for certain source distributions, e.g., PU = (0.9, 0.1). As a
consequence, larger H(X) is needed as shown in Table II. However, the minimal I(R;UX) or
the minimal H(X) can be obtained using different partition codes. We conclude that compression
before encryption is a suboptimal strategy to minimize key consumption or the number of channel
uses in EPS systems.
TABLE I
COMPARING DIFFERENT SCHEMES WITH Φ = (1, 1, 1, 3, 4, 7, 11) AND PU (i) = Φ(i)/28 FOR 1 ≤ i ≤ 7
Huffman Shannon Partition C(Φ)
I(R;UX) 2.357 2.679 2.291 = H(U)
H(X) 6 5 5
TABLE II
COMPARING DIFFERENT SCHEMES WITH Φ = (9, 1), Φ′ = (1, 1) AND PU = (0.9, 0.1)
Huffman Shannon Partition C(Φ) Partition C(Φ′)
I(R;UX) 1 1.3 0.469 = H(U) 1
H(X) 1 4 4 1
Suppose now that the source distribution is d-adic and the smallest probability mass in PU is
equal to d−k for certain integers d and k. What were binary digits in the scheme described above
in Fig. 9 now become d-ary symbols. It can be verified that the longest codeword has length equal
to k. Therefore, both d-ary Shannon codes and d-ary Huffman codes can achieve the minimal
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H(X) and H(R) in (74). Furthermore, the expected codeword length is equal to H(U). By (93),
I(R;UX) is equal to the expected codeword length, which is equal to H(U). Therefore, the
minimal I(R;UX) is achieved. However, a prefix code cannot achieve the expected codeword
length H(U) when PU is not d-adic [5, Theorem 4.6]. Again consider the example in Table II
where PU = (0.9, 0.1). Only partition code but neither the Shannon nor the Huffman code can be
used to achieve I(R;UX) = H(U). Indeed, the d-adic distribution is just a special case of the
condition used in Theorem 13. Therefore, the partition code can achieve the minimal I(R;UX)
for a wider range of PU .
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 9
Suppose there exists u ∈ U such that PU(u) is irrational. Define a new random variable U∗
such that
U∗ =


0 if U = u
1 otherwise.
Then PU∗(0) and PU∗(1) are irrational. As U∗ is a function of U , by (5) – (7) and (63),
I(U∗;R) = I(U∗;X) = I(X ;R) = H(U∗ | XR) = 0. (95)
Therefore, it suffices to consider binary U .
Let X and R be the respective supports of X and R. Suppose to the contrary first that |X |
and |R| are both finite. We can assume without loss of generality that
X = {1, . . . , n} (96)
R = {1, . . . , m}. (97)
Let
xi = PX(i), i = 1, . . . , n (98)
rj = PR(j), j = 1, . . . , m, (99)
and let x be the n-row vector with entries xi. Similarly, define the column vector r.
As X and R are independent and H(U | XR) = 0, there exists a function g such that
U = g(X,R). Hence, from X and R we induce a n×m decoding matrix G with entries
Gi,j = f(i, j), i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , m.
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Then
m∑
j=1
Gi,jrj = PU(1), i = 1, . . . , n (100)
n∑
i=1
xi =
m∑
j=1
rj = 1 (101)
xi ≥ 0, rj ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , m (102)
m∑
i=1
xiGi,j = PU(1), j = 1, . . . , m (103)
Here, (100) is due to the fact that I(U ;X) = 0, (101) and (102) are required since PX and PR
are probability distributions, and (103) follows from I(U ;R) = 0.
In fact, for any x, r and binary matrix G satisfying the above four conditions, one can construct
random variables {U,R,X} such that
I(U ;R) = I(U ;X) = I(X ;R) = H(U | XR) = 0 (104)
where U = f(X,R) and the probability distributions of X and R are specified by the vectors x
and r respectively.
In the following, we will prove that if the rows of G are not independent, then we can construct
another random variable X∗ with support X ∗, |X ∗| < |X | such that
I(U ;R) = I(U ;X∗) = I(X∗;R) = H(U | X∗R) = 0. (105)
To prove this claim, suppose that there exists disjoint subsets A and B of {1, . . . , n} and
positive numbers αi, i ∈ A ∪ B such that∑
i∈A
αiGi =
∑
k∈B
αkGk. (106)
where Gi is row i of G. Then we will claim that∑
i∈A
αi =
∑
k∈B
αk.
Multiplying both sides of (106) by r,∑
i∈A
αiGir =
∑
k∈B
αkGkr (107)
∑
i∈A
αiPU(1) =
∑
k∈B
αkPU(1) (108)
∑
i∈A
αi =
∑
k∈B
αk. (109)
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Let ǫ , mini∈A∪B xi/αi. Assume without loss of generality that n ∈ A and that ǫ = xn/αn.
Define
x∗i =


xi − ǫαi, i ∈ A
xi + ǫαi, i ∈ B
xi, otherwise.
Note that x∗n = 0. Suppose that the probability distribution of X is changed such that PX(i) = x∗i .
Then it can be checked easily that U,X,R still satisfy (5) – (7) and (63). Furthermore, the size
of the support of PX is |X | ≤ n− 1.
Repeating this procedure, we can prove that for any random variable U , if there exists auxiliary
random variables X,R satisfying (5) – (7) and (63), then there exists auxiliary random variables
X∗, R∗ such that (95) is satisfied and the rows and columns of the decoding matrix induced by
X∗ and R∗ are all linearly independent. Hence, the decoding matrix G induced by X∗ and R∗
must be square (and thus m = n). Consequently,
n∑
i=1
xiGi,j = PU(1), j = 1, . . . , n. (110)
There exists a unique solution (z1, . . . , zn) such that
n∑
i=1
ziGi,j = 1, j = 1, . . . , n. (111)
Clearly, zi = xi/PU(1). As all the entries in G are either 0 or 1, all the zi are rational numbers.
Therefore,
1 =
n∑
i=1
xi = PU(1)
n∑
i=1
zi. (112)
Hence, PU(1) must be rational and a contradiction occurs. We have proved that X and R cannot
be both finite. The case when only X or R is finite can be similarly proved.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied perfect secrecy systems with zero decoding error at the receiver, with the
additional assumption that the message U and the secret key R are independent, I(U ;R) = 0.
Under this setup, we found a new bound log |U| ≤ H(R) on the key requirement, improving on
Shannon’s fundamental bound H(U) ≤ H(R) for perfect secrecy.
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To transmit the ciphertext X , the lower bound on the minimum number of channel uses has
been shown to be log |U| ≤ H(X). If the source distribution is defined on a countably infinite
support or a support with unbounded size, no security system can simultaneously achieve perfect
secrecy and zero decoding error.
We also defined and justified three new concepts: residual secret randomness, expected key
consumption, and excess key consumption. We have demonstrated the feasibility of extracting
residual secret randomness in multi-round secure communications which use a sequence of
error free perfect secrecy systems. We quantified the residual secret randomness as H(R|UX).
We further distinguished between the size H(R) of the secret key required prior to the
commencement of transmission, and the expected key consumption I(R;UX) in a multi-round
setting. In contrast to H(R) ≥ log |U|, we showed that I(R;UX) is lower bounded by H(U),
giving a more precise understanding about the role of source entropy in error free perfect secrecy
systems. The excess key consumption is quantified as I(R;X), and is equal to 0 if and only if
the minimal expected key consumption is achieved.
One of the main objectives of this paper was to reveal the fundamental tradeoff between
expected key consumption and the number of channel uses. For the regime where the minimal
I(R;UX) is assumed, H(X) and H(R) are inevitably larger and corresponding lower bounds
for H(X) and H(R) have been obtained. If the source distribution PU has irrational numbers,
the additional requirements on the alphabet sizes of X and R to achieve minimal I(R;UX) have
been shown. We have proposed a new code, the partition code, which generalizes the one-time
pad, and can achieve minimal I(R;UX) when all the probability masses in PU are rational. In
some cases, the partition code can simultaneously attain the minimal H(X) and H(R) in this
regime.
At the other extreme, the regime where the minimal number of channel uses is assumed, the
one-time pad has been shown to be optimal. For the intermediate regime, we have formulated
an optimization problem for the fundamental tradeoff between I(R;UX) and H(X). We also
demonstrated that compression before encryption cannot minimize either H(R), H(X) or
I(R;UX).
This paper has highlighted a few open problems. First, the complete characterization of the
tradeoff between I(R;UX) and H(X) remains open. Second, the partition code is only one
class of codes designed to minimize expected key consumption. Codes achieving other points
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on the tradeoff curve are yet to be discovered. In particular, a code achieving minimal H(X)
and H(R) in the regime of minimal expected key consumption is important for the design of
efficient and secure systems.
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